Identities in the Middle East
Sylvia Rust
Y490
12-5-2019
Identities in the Middle East
Identity politics have become a very divisive part of the world as we know it today. In the United States, it seems everything is split among political, religious, gender, and racial divides. In the Middle East and North Africa, identity is divided similarly, except it has a much richer past and a much more complex and less researched future.
There’s an idea in the West that the Middle East is full of a homogenous group of people that are religious, oppressive, and conservative. Although there are many states that are based on Islamic principles, to conflate an entire region of the world (25 countries if you include all of the Arabic speaking countries) into this superimposed, problematic breeding ground for extremism is not only incorrect, but it’s dangerous. Many forget that often extremist groups are targeting fellow Arabs and those that live in the Middle East. The most casualties from extremism do not come from days like 9/11, they come from everyday bombings, shootings, etc. The uprisings in countries like Syria aren’t always based in extremism, but in response to problematic political principles. (Nubar, p. 5).
Before WWII:
Afghani vs. the Shah
1919 Egyptian Revolution
Palestine during the Ottoman Empire
Peasants; illiteracy, poverty, and ignorance (fellahin); the eyes
Shaykhs and power in early nineteenth century
Landowning and wealthy in Jerusalem (al-Husayni, al-Khalidi, al-Nashahibi)
Christian Arabs
Jews from Russia in 1880s
Ottoman policy stated that Jews could come into the Empire but not settle into Palestine or expect any special treatment -- this caused a rift among Jewish settlers/colonizers -- Oriental Jews vs Ashkenazi Jews
1897 Zionist Movement formation -- Herzl
24,000 in 1882 -> 85,000 in 1914
Young Turk Revolution of 1908 (Zionist Movement)
Abdulhamid -- 1876-1908 -- Pan-Islamist (opposed Zionism in Palestine)
Bribery, buying land in Arab names, coming into Palestine from Egypt, etc.
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire -- how this affected Arab identities and Turks
Mandel, Neville. The Arabs and Zionism: Before World War I. 1976.
Mandates for the Middle East (Baxter, 15) adopted by the Allied powers at the San Remo Conference in 1920, confirmed by UN in 1922
French received Mandate for Syria; approving Lebanon a distinct entity -- assure political dominance of (Maronite) Christian majority
British took a dominant position in Palestine -- tutelage for independent statehood, couldn’t just be a colony & the Balfour Declaration - giving the Jewish the notion of a national home in Palestine
Palestine during British Mandate from 1922-1948
Sunni Muslims
Christian Arabs
Shiite Muslims
After WWII:
1947 - UN recognized both the rights of the Jewish and Arab nationalist communities in Palestine
1948 - Israel’s declaration of Independence; challenged by Arab states -- War of Independence of 1948-1949 -- left 700,000 Palestinian refugees -- denied the right to return to their homes in the aftermath of the 1948-1949 war
Six Day War - Israel captured the Arab Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza, Egypt’s Sinai and Syria’s Golan Heights. UN Resolution 242
Baxter, Chapter 5, p. 83
Pan-Arabism -- the Ba’ath Party and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser
Sayyid Wutb and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Iranian Revolution)
1950s-1960s - Arab unification under a single political structure; based on common history, language, culture
League of Arab states in 1945 (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon)
1953 - Nasser overthrew king (held monarchy since 1919) in Egypt
Pan-Arabism halted because of 6 Day War (1967)
Political Islam (Islamism)
Jihad (militant approach vs personal struggle) p. 88
Muslim Brotherhood
Political Islam -> Islamic terrorism (al-Qaeda and ISIS)
The Afghan conflict
Iranian Revolution & Pan-Shi’ism
Nationalism and religious zeal
Iran-Iraq War
Today:
Hezbollah, HAMAS, US-led wars in the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iraq) and their impact on Islamism (Verbage: ‘unlawful combatants’, rather than soldiers, so they didn’t have to declare war)
Arab uprisings: Tunisia -- corruption, lack of political representation, transparency and accountability, lack of political opportunities, repression (Baxter, 165)
Removed ruler from power: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen
Civil uprisings had erupted in Bahrain and Syria
Major protests broke out in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, and Sudan
Minor protests had occurred in Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Western Sahara, and Palestine
(Look to Gause for more information on Persian Gulf conflicts)
file:///C:/Users/sylvi/Downloads/power%20identity.pdf (Regional Order after Arab Uprisings)
Old Arabism (Nasser) vs New Arabism (Al-Jazeera) (everyday arab identity)
file:///C:/Users/sylvi/Downloads/anti%20maerican%20stiment%20as%20%20media%20effect.pdf (Anti-American sentiments in Arab Media) history of why the Arab news (Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya) do not like America. 9/11, involvement in Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, etc.
Nisbet -- Challenging the State: Transnational TV and Political Identity in the ME
Sunni vs. Shi’ite Conflict in the Region after 2011
Secular nationalism vs Spiritual nationalism
-- Druze, Christian, Muslim identities
The erasure of Arab Hebrew/Arab Jews in Israeli politics
Arab Americans have a hard time describing their identity because much of it is based not only their national identity, but in their religious and regional identities as well.
file:///C:/Users/sylvi/Downloads/arab%20american%20women%20identies.pdf (research on Arab women’s feelings/lives in America as Arabs in the world after 9/11/01)
Arab Regionalism: A Post-Structural Perspective Silvia Ferabolli
Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the Comoros Islands, Iraq, Djibouti, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Turkey
League of Arab States (LAS) oldest regional organization (1945) regionalism (Ferbolli, p. 8)
Dividing north and south, black and white, Muslim and non-Muslim has consequences
Middle East - Israel at the center, North Africa, Turkey and Iran, the Levant and Gulf (Central Asia and Afganistan) (Ferbolli, p. 27).
Tibi’s breakdown, “Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1961-91: Regional Dynamic and the Superpowers” ME subsections: Mashrek (near east), Maghreb (North Africa), Gulf region, Iran, Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, non-Arab state actors, East African states in Arab League — Somalia and Djibouti (Ferbolli, p. 30)
Ferbolli p 35 Michael Schulz “Regionalization in a Globalizing World” “ideogloical pan-Arabism in its earliest forms has not led to any ‘real’ regionalization process… and this may not be a realistic option in the foreseeable future”
Pan-Arabism = peace promoting? Arab/ME more neutral terms for region
General Abdel Nasser - Suez Canal — 1956 Arab nationalist discourse (Ferbolli, p. 39) nationalization of Canal was symbol of Arab independence
Egyptians lead LAS, funded it, and staffed it. 1967 War
Post-1967 Arab World relations among states improved after the Six Day War (Ferbolli, 41)
Arab League expanded with Mauritania, Djibouti, and Somalia
Arab League agreed with Arab boycott and support in bloc for the Palestinians
Arabization of Arab school curriculums (MSA)
Cultural collective identity — labor migration from non-oil states to oil-rich countries
Saudi Arabia — Gulfanization of the Arab World (David Ottawa)
Ferbolli p 42
Borders in the Arab region
Arab identity, and Arab regional identity
Arab parents, Arab parents parents
I am Arab because I speak Arabic and am Muslim
I speak Arabic but I am not Arab. I am Somali
We are all Palestinians, all Iraqis in suffering
No such thing as Arab politics
Ferbolli p 54
Language is defining the “Arab ness of the arabs” (Halliday) p 55 Ferbolli
If you speak Arabic, you are Arab. Unless your parents are not Arabs.
Leila Ahmed - Egyptian - could not speak Arabic well. “We are arabs” rhetoric. Erasing Egyptian identity (example of French citizen having to ID as European and ignore their French history/culture)
Understanding the Contemporary Middle East - Jillian Schwedler
North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and the sub-Saharan states: Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan
Fertile Crescent: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, non-Arab Turkey
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, Yemen and non-Arab Persian state of Iran (Schwedler, 3).
Trade routes connecting ME to the rest of the World
Arab Spring/Uprisings
Chapter 2: the Middle East: A geographic Preface
Ian R. manners, Barbara McKean Parmenter, and Ryan King
Camels in the desert, oil derricks pumping thick black crude, rows of men kneeling praying, bearded protesters shouting slogans
Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
Cairo’s Tehran Square protests (in the space that was built as a square to be modern/Western) protest by women, tradesman, students, street vendors
ME has many diverse climates (11)
Languages: arabic, turkish, persian (12)
Berber in Morocco and Algeria
Baluchi in southeastern Iran
Kurdish (4th largest)
Hebrew
Ottoman Empire 16th century
18th and 19th centuries: tartar and turkish regions Russian domination
Balkans nationalist aspirations and Austria and allies
North Africa colonial authority French: Algeria (1830) and Tunisia (1881) and Italian: Libya (1911)
Independent rulers of Egypt and Lebanon
Turkey -- Ataturk Dam -- protests from Syria and Iraq
Chapter 3: Historical Context: Arthur Goldschmidt Jr.
Post wwi peace settlement 1919 paris peace conference, husayns son 61
Chapter 4: Middle Eastern Politics
Chapter 10: Kinship, Class, and Ethnicity Laurie King-Irani
Israel/Palestine
Lebanon
Iraq
Collective identities based on sectarian identities, Israel, Iran, Turkey
Lebanon and Israel living remnants of the Ottoman millet system; juridical category, social institutions, bundles of rights and duties and lived practices are based in ethnoconfessional sects: Jews in Israel and Maronite, Sunni, Shi’a, Druze or any of the other 18 sects in Lebanon — composed solely of minorities
Civil marriages across ethnoconfessional communities is not permitted.
Marriage to fathers brothers daughter is still preferable (first cousins)
Pastoral nomadism now rare in ME: difficult to move around in a nation state
Kinship groups
Like Saudi Arabia - House of Saud
Syrias uprising can be seen as people against a repressive government and a majority Sunni group against a minority Alawite group (that Bashir is a part of)
Patrilineal kinship system - flexible and effective over centuries under variety of social, economic, and political conditions in the Middle East
Began as an adaptive response to ecological and social limitations gradually became a valued institution embodying a rich cultural complex of expectations, values, rituals and beliefs (328)
Feminist anthropologists doing gender-oriented kinship studies (329)
Ethnicity
Anthropologists view ethnic groups as subcultures 330
Israel Ashkenazi Jews minority but lead in wealth and control state’s decision making bodies over Arab Jews or non-Jews
Ottoman identities =/= Ottomans, Arabs, Turks or Kurds but based on religious ideation (Muslims, Christians, Druze, Jews)
Islam considers Jews and Christians “people of the book”
In Ottoman times, as long as non-Muslims paid their taxes and obeyed laws, they were to be left alone; they even had rulings and guidance from their own religious hierachies
Social Class
Economic and political differences
Hierarchy arrangement
Social classes cannot exist without each other
Until 150 years ago, the Middle East had a simple social class structure (336, Philip Khoury social historian) until capitalism came to ME
Muslims and nonMuslim elites benefited from these reforms giving them cash crops like tobacco
While merchants (Christians and Jews) began making money as middlemen for European goods and ME consumers
Urban proletariat
Created pyramidal class structure
- think continues, most people live at or below the poverty line
Despite stereotype about Arab sheikhs
Kin and ethnic-based patron-client relationships linking the government with its constituents holds the ME nationstates together
Chapter 11: the role of women Lisa Pollard
The World Through Arab Eyes - Shibley Telhami
Arab Public Opinion
February 2011 “Arab Identities” the fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt
When the palestinian-Israeli peace agreement fell apart
US vs Muslims after 9/11
Afghanistan and Iraq
Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon
Israel-Gaza War in 2008-2009
P18
Polling on arabs self-identity:
Citizens of country, arab, muslim (or christian), citizen of the world
1950s Arab identity rallied behind Arab nationalist president (Gamal Abd al-Nasser) of Egypt after 1956 Suez crisis -- Muslim Brotherhood strong grassroots organization based on Muslim identity
Stood up to Frane, Britain, and Israel to maintain and nationalize the Suez Canal
Two major identities - Muslim and Arab (p 28)
Lebanon deep sectarianism (p. 32)
Transnational arab media
Al Jazeera
Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization edited by Robert W. Hefner
Sectarianism in the Middle East Author(s): Lawrence G. Potter Source: Great Decisions, (2015), pp. 29-40 Published by: Foreign Policy Association
"[Sectarianism in Syria and Iraq has... often been characterized as the product of tensions raging since time immemorial and framed as the lat- est manifestation of an irreconcilable Sunni-Shi'i conflict, explained away by the 'ancient ethnic hatred' trope," wrote Ibrahim Marashi, an assistant professor of history at California State University
Religion, power and chaos in the Middle East Rafael L. Bardají
Difference between Saudi Arabia and Iran
Power and strategy
Sunni vs Shi’a
“In the Middle East, Western writers frequently, and inaccurately, character- ized Sunnis as "orthodox" Muslims and the Shi'is as "heterodox." Both Sunnis, who make up about 90% of the world's Muslims, and Shi'is, at about 10%, are large groups with innumerable sub- group” p. 30
P33
the table for a year. In both Iran and Iraq, but especially the latter, the demonization of the oppo- nent led to a stronger sense of national identity. Both waged a fierce struggle on the ideological and propaganda fronts. They invoked several broad themes: Arab against Persian, Sunni against Shi'i, and pan-Arabism against pan-Islam
This practice, along with the identification of political parties with ethnic or religious groups, has led some to wonder whether Iraq was a viable state or could break up. Such practices mimic the sectarian structure of governance in Lebanon es- tablished in the unwritten National Pact of 1 943 , modified by the Taif Agreement of 1989. Under this pact, the president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament a Shi'i Muslim
Years of warfare have politicized identity groups -- based on religion and ethnicity - Sectarianism 39
Secular and Islamic Feminism
Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s: Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond Author(s): Margot Badran Source: Journal of Middle East Women's Studies , Winter, 2005, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter, 2005), pp. 6-28
Localism
Sufism
The impact on sectarian relations is cross-cutting. On the one hand, less interaction between sects decreases the daily incidence of conflict. On the other hand, the segregation of communities deepens prejudices, foreshadowing a brewing conflict that is slowly building toward release
The Future of Sectarian Relations in the Middle East Author(s): Jeffrey Martini, Heather Williams and William Young RAND Corporation (2017)
The Place of Locality for Identity in the Nation: Minority Narratives of Cosmopolitan Istanbul Author(s): Amy Mills Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies , Aug., 2008, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Aug., 2008), pp. 383-401
WOMEN, SOCIAL PROTESTS, AND THE NEW MEDIA ACTIVISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA Author(s): Elham Gheytanchi and Valentine N. Moghadam Source: International Review of Modern Sociology, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 2014), pp. 1-26 Published by: International Journals
use of the new information and communication technologies (ICTs)
the Internet, the introduction of satellite TVs in MENA has opened up the possibility for marginalized groups to be connected to their peers elsewhere in the world and outside of state limits
IN IT FOR THE LONG HAUL: A NEW RESPONSE FOR IDPs IN THE KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ Author(s): Middle East Research Institute Middle East Research Institute (2015)
Over one million of these internally displaced persons (IDPs) have sought protection in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which already hosts almost 250,000 Syrian refugees as well as other IDPs from previous regional conflicts. As the conflict in Iraq moves from its second to third year, international and local stakeholders have begun to recognise the need to prepare for what may well become a protracted crisis
As such a key finding from this meeting was that the current emergency-focused response must shift to a more nuanced, long-term, collaborative approach, focused on promoting self-sustaining livelihoods and cohesion among IDP and host communities in the foreseeable future while laying groundwork for voluntary, safe, dignified, and informed returns in the longer-term. Three pillars, underpinned by sensitivity to gender, age, religion, and ethnicity, should sustain this new approach by: • Primarily, fostering co-existence and resilience within host communities so that displaced populations are able to pursue independent and sustainable lives in the foreseeable future. • While, investing in better conditions in the areas of origin to facilitate voluntary returns in the longer-term. • And finally, establishing and respecting an acceptable standard in terms of human rights and welfare that should be guaranteed to both the displaced and host communities. This latter pillar is cross-cutting to the two pillars above.
At present, one out of six residents in the region is a displaced person -- Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
Report Part Title: Understanding Gender Inequality in the MENA Region Report Title: Gender Equality and Mena Women’s Empowerment in the Aftermath of the 2011 Arab Uprisings Report Author(s): Pamela Abbott Published by: Arab Transformations Project (2017)
Three main explanations for the subordination of women in the ‘patriarchal belt’ have been suggested. Firstly, that there is a male-dominated kinship/property system which leads women to accept the patriarchal bargain (Caldwell 1982; Kandiyoti 1988). This explanation is inadequate, however, as other regions have the same kinship system but high female labour force participation (Blumberg 2016). The second is that it is Islam or rather the patriarchal values embedded in the belief system, but again it is not the case that women are held back in all Muslim countries and some countries in the ‘patriarchal belt’ are non-Muslim. Furthermore, Christianity and Judaism share may of the patriarchal values found in Islam. The third is that women’s economic bargaining power is low in the countries in the ‘patriarchal belt’. Historically women have not been engaged in the main productive activities (Blumberg 2015, 2016)
Gender In Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco And Tunisia
Differences between men’s and women’s achievements in the six countries in four key areas are discussed: human development and education, economic empowerment, political empowerment and legal empowerment. For women to be able to claim and exercise their rights, these have to be enshrined in law, the laws and related policies have to be effectively implement and enforced, women have to know what their rights are, and they have to be able to claim and exercise them. Access to the law is an essential part of this.
The Political Decline of Religion in the MiddleEast
Ben-Ami, Shlomo . Project Syndicate ; Prague [Prague]21 June 2018.
religious factors are probably among the first that come
to mind. But, nowadays, competing strategic interests and imperial ambitions play a much larger role than religious or sectarian cleavages in defining regional politics.
Despite having long been viewed as a
result of the Sunni-Shia divide, the competition is really between two opposing political systems: Iran’s
revolutionary regime, bent on changing the regional balance of power, versus Saudi Arabia’s conservative
monarchy, which seeks to uphold the old regional order.
In this context, Iran’s support of the Arab Spring uprisings makes sense. In an Arab-dominated Middle East, nonArab Iran is the natural enemy; but in a Muslim Middle East, the Islamic republic of Iran is a potential hegemon. So
Iran was quick to back free elections, predicting that voters would bring Islamists to power
So, while maintaining its close alliance with the United States, the Western
imperial power that Iran fears most, Saudi Arabia opposed the uprisings, whether the protagonists were Shia (as in
Bahrain), or Sunni (as in Egypt). In this sense, the Arab Spring was a story of the growth and suppression of
political Islam
Moreover, alliances no longer fit within Sunni-Shia borders, further underscoring the primacy of politics, rather than religion, in fueling regional conflicts. For example, Hamas, the Sunni fundamentalist group that rules the Gaza Strip, has survived largely as a result of financing from Iran. Similarly, Oman, dominated by Ibhadis and Sunnis, has a closer relationship with Iran, with which it shares control of the vital oil-shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz, than it does with Saudi Arabia. In fact, Oman is now being accused of helping Iran to smuggle weapons to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, where Iran and Saudi Arabia are fighting a proxy war. Likewise, Qatar maintains a relationship with Iran, with which it shares colossal gas fields, that is too close for Saudi Arabia’s comfort. Last year, the Saudis led a coalition of Arab countries –including the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain –in isolating Qatar diplomatically and imposing sanctions. And yet Turkey, another Sunni power, maintains a military base in Qatar. And this is not the only source of tension between Saudi Arabia and Turkey; they also disagree about the Muslim Brotherhood. Whereas the Saudis view the Brotherhood as an existential threat, Turkey considers it a model of Islamist politics worth defending and a means of expanding Turkish influence in the Arab world But Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood has put it at odds with yet another Sunni power: Egypt. Indeed, the Brotherhood is Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s nemesis. Together with its regional ambitions and efforts to position itself as the main champion of the Palestinian cause, Turkey appears to be directly challenging Egypt’s vital interests. Perhaps the best illustration of how security and strategic concerns have superseded religious conflict is the shift in relations between Arab Sunni states –including the Gulf monarchies and Egypt –and Israel.
